pendent on the availability of salient possible outcomes in the person perception task. Direction of the counterfactual comparison, upward or downward, did not moderate any of the effects, providing evidence that the process of thinking counterfactually, and not the content of the counterfactuals, was responsible for the priming effects. These experiments also provide evidence that the effects of mind-set accessibility, similarto semantic construct accessibility, are limited bythe applicability of the primes to the later judgments. Implications for the nature of priming effects are discussed. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Varey, 1990) . You might experience the cognitions, "if only I had not moved, I would have won," thereby lo cating causality in your movement (Wells & Gavanski, 1989) . You might feel a poignant sense of disappointment and regret (Kahneman & Miller, 1986 (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977) Kahneman and Tversky (1982) originally discussed counterfactual thinking and mental simulation within the context of the availability heuristic. According to Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986) . One could, through process of mental simulation, assess the probability that a particular plan will succeed, assess alternatives, and evaluate the various risks involved. One could also seek to explain through simulation why a particular event did not work out. The commencement of a particular simulation is often initiated when an event nearly occurred (e.g., missing one's flight by 5 minutes as op posed to 50 minutes) or when antecedents to that event are exceptional in some way (missing one's flight after taking a new route to the airport) (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Roese, 1997) . The relative ease of altering some feature of reality determines the strength and psychological close ness of counterfactual alternatives. In addition, surprising outcomes (e.g., ones that violate expectancies) and negative events spontaneously activate a simulated search for alternative realities (Sanna & Turley, 1996; Roese & Hur, 1997 ; Roese & Olson, 1997) .
The availability of counterfactual alternatives produces a number of well-replicated judgmental consequences: (a) amplification of emotion (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Macrae & Milne, 1992) , (b) altered judgments of causality (Wells & Gavanski, 1989 , but see Mandel and Lehman (1996) for a distinction between causal attribution and counterfactual think ing), (c) increased victim compensation awards (Miller & McFarland, 1986) , (d) increased suspiciousness (Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1989) , and (e) exacerbation of the hindsight bias (Roese & Olson, 1996) . For example, Medvec, Madey, and Gilovich (1995) Similarly, Chen, Shechter, and Chaiken (1996) (Hirt & Markman, 1995 Gollwitzer et al. (1990) , the activa tion of the simulation heuristic by Hirt and Markman (1995) , or the di rected instructions to engage in counterfactual thinking by Roese (1994) (Miller & Taylor, 1995 There is some suggestive evidence that perception of focal actors in a counterfactual scenario is dependent upon the downward and up ward nature of the counterfactual thoughts. In a study by Johnson (1986) , participants rated an individual who suffers a negative event with salient upward counterfactual alternatives (similar to the one de scribed in the introduction), more negatively overall than did control participants. Participants also rated an individual who nearly experi ences a negative event, and thus inspires counterfactual thoughts that focus on downward alternatives, more positively overall than did con trol participants. Unfortunately, the Johnson study used a number of semantic differentials (e.g., good/bad; positive/negative; strong/weak) that were not trait-specific. Therefore, it is difficult to discern the particular traits participants felt could describe the target person and whether counterfactuals were acting as self-generated se mantic primes.
A second possibility is that counterfactuals manifest an influence through a primed affective construct. Experiment 1 examined the first mechanism described above whether counterfactual events could produce sufficient trait construct activation to serve as semantic primes. Moskowitz and Roman (1992) (Walster, 1966) and that people often think that good outcomes come to good people (Lerner & Miller, 1978) . As Allison, Mackie, and Messick (1996) (person) on the dimension supposedly made acces sible by the priming stimulus (e.g., Higgins et al., 1977; Devine, 1989 (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) that it is the third mechanism described above, priming a mental simulation mind-set, through which counterfactuals exert their influence. In addition, these materials are well suited for testing these models because Donald is ambiguous on more than one pair of oppositely valenced traits (adventurous-reckless; independent-aloof) (Higgins et al., 1977 (Martin, 1986; Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999) . Participants were instructed to form an impression of Donald as they read the paragraph. On the following page, participants were asked to characterize Donald on a 9-point scale. For participants making the applicable judgment, the rating scale was anchored at ad venturous (1) and reckless (9). For participants making the inapplicable judgment, the rating scale was anchored at independent (1) and aloof (9). We did not include the type of trait judgment (reckless-adventurous and independent-aloof) as a within-subjects variable because past (Moskowitz & Roman, 1992) and current research (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 1999) (Srull & Wyer, 1979 Kahneman and Tversky (1982) can be made accessible by exposure to mutable events, in which an alterna tive outcome almost occurred, and can affect subsequent judgments (Hirt & Markman, 1995 (Higgins, 1996) . That is, they demonstrated that their various mind-set manipulations had divergent effects, but they did not demonstrate where and if these effects would not occur. We demonstrated that our mental simulation mind-set did not produce effects on subsequent judg ments that did not lend themselves to influence by mental simulation, namely Donald's independence. By demonstrating that the mind-set priming effects are limited to applicable material which can potentially be transformed by the cognitive processes and orientations proffered by the mind-set, these experiments further suggest a uniform law of prim ing effects. Primed constructs and mind-sets exert influence on future, unrelated tasks and judgments to the extent that the prime is relevant and applicable to the judgmental dimensions and to the extent that the object of judgment is potentially able to be influenced (i.e., ambiguous for semantic primes and mutable for counterfactual primes).
Future research should further explore the differentiation of mind-set primes and semantic primes by investigating whether awareness of a priming influence leads to contrast effects following mind-set primes as it does with semantic primes (Martin, 1986; Moskowitz & Roman, 1992; Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999; Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kubler, & Wanke, 1993; Wegener & Petty, 1997) . The majority of priming studies that find assimilation of person perception judgments to an activated construct do so when the primes are outside of awareness, especially when partici pants believe no relationship exists between the priming task and the judgment task (Higgins, 1996) . Participants interpret their reaction to the target to have originated in the target's behavior, rather than appre ciating that the reaction had roots in the incidental exposure to previous information. Martin (1986) 
